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OSS Form No. 4066
(Rev. 1/6/45)

TOP SECRET

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To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE: Chambers	ACCESSION NO.: COTS 849
ADDRESSED TO:	
DOCUMENT DATE:	ACCESSION DATE: 11 August 1945
DOCUMENT NO.: 17,190 A COPY NO.:	OFFICE OR BRANCH: D.C.
NO. OF PAGES: 1 ATTACHMENTS: Report	LOGGED BY: AJS

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[illegible]

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COVER STORY W.W. WILLIAM PRESTON CHANDLER

Cover Name WALTER PAUL CHANDLER

I was born in Clear Springs, Texas April 1, 1907, attended grammar school at Clear Springs and high school at Dublin, Texas. I attended John Tarleton Agricultural College from 1925 thru 1929 and majored in Animal Husbandry and worked for my father, W. W. Chandler, on the ranch at Dublin until 1934 when I married Dorothy Surman and bought the JY ranch near Post City, Texas. I operated the ranch until I came into the army in 1940 with the Texas National Guard. My unit, the 112th Cavalry Regiment, was sent to Ft. Bliss, Texas where we were made a part of the First Cavalry Division and Mechanized and reformed into mechanized units. My unit was armed with armored half-tracks for scouting and reconnaissance work. I went overseas with my unit in early 1943 as a master sergeant - Squadron Intelligence Sgt. We first went into combat in the Admiralty group north of New Guinea and I was wounded in early 1944 at Bormote airfield on Los Negros and evacuated to the 25th Evac. Hospital on New Hebrides. My back was broken when my half-track was turned over by a mine. I was given a battlefield commission along with decorations for my work on Los Negros. In Oct. 1944 my unit moved up to the Philligines and I was sent back to the States, where I was put on limited service and assigned as an instructor at [redacted] Camp Ritchie, Md. In December I fell and reinjured my back and was sent to Walter Reed Gen. Hosp. at Wash., D.C. I went before a Disposition Board in April and it was decided that I was unfit for further military service and was awarded 50% disability. I received my orders May 28 and left for Dallas via. St Louis. I spent two weeks with my family and decided to spend a short vacation on the west coast and look for some ranch help before settling down to work on my ranch. I left Dallas June 13 and arrived El Paso the next day and the next day (Friday) arrived in L.A. Spent Friday night, saturday and Sunday in L.A. and came down to S. D. Monday to see the border.

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Abalone III

St Wm P Chandler
51-413

Operation Report
Agent: W.P. Chandler

Excellent Question
Report

1. June 18, 0800 - sailed after returning to pier twice for key personnel. Dropped off with six other agents in Santa Ana looking as conspicuous as prostitutes in a chapel. Boarded stream line train in Santa Ana for a stream line stand to San Diego, arriving about 1530.
Took a room in Grant Hotel with Mr William E. Dawson, an accomplice, and immediately began casing the joint for possibilities of installing and operating our clandestine radio, the mystery to the Bell Hop as to why our bags were so heavy.
Made first contact with agent Allen at 2100, under the shadow of a Naval Ensign who appeared entirely uninterested and received pass from Allen about a block away from contact in a small hotel phone booth.
Contacted agent Andrews in the Grant Hotel at 2130 and made pass to Courier in drug store phone booth at 2200, making a very friendly and lovely native wait more than an hour

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[illegible]
Operation Report
Chandler

used friendly natives car to tour the City of San Diego. Saw a fight between a Civilian and two service men about 0100 at a bar in.

Natives dropped us off at our Hotel about 0130 and we found we had to get a pass from the room clerk before we could get to our room.

Installing the radio antenna wasn't as simple as it first appeared. On my way from the 3rd to the 7th floor via the stairs I was stopped by a house dick who assumed that I was a prowler and announced his intention to have me hauled in. However after a lengthy conversation he let me go and got me a ride on the elevator on up to the 7th floor where it was imperative that I see a friend to warn him that his girl friend's husband was in town. I went directly to the end of the hall above our room and secured one end of the antenna wire to the window hinge and dropped the wire roll over the ledge. Dawson secured the other end to the balcony on our room and we had a dam good but conspicious antenna.

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Abstract
Operations Report
Chandler

2. June 19 found Dawson and I in the 'sack' until 9. Two bits persuaded the negro maid to Police our room while we were out to breakfast and we set up the radio by 10 and staged on the air 'till 12 never being able to contact home base.
At noon I went to the Police Dept. and paid a call on Chief Peterson that proved darned unsuccessful for Dawson and me. Pete's 23 years in Police work proved too much for my cover story, however he made the mistake of letting me go and hanging a tail on me. The Chief told me that O.S.S. operated in the vicinity from time to time and that they used a radio that screwed up the frequency (3910 KC) used by his department to communicate with Mexico. He also told me that he was just told by F.C.C. that they had picked up a radio between 1100 and 1200 and had located it somewhere in the vicinity of 4th and Broadway. Pete made the remark that he had some of his

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Shelone Ill
& Paraphrase Report
Chandler

men out looking for the radio at that time.

In our Conversation about security breaches Chief Pete opined that O.S.S. sent men to cross the border and they were no doubt darned good suspects. He further declared that O.S.S. was a bunch of "Dam Communists" along with several other remarks some of which were directed at Col. Allen, of whom Pete has heard. When Pete saw his bait was obvious he asked me directly if I was with O.S.S. and after denying it several times, he became darned curious and started making phone calls.

I left the Police Station about 1400 with two dicks for a tail. I boarded a street car on Market street and the dicks car hanging about half a block behind could have been a little more obvious if they had had a big sign on top reading something like "I'M Tailing You". I got off at the Greyhound Bus depot and called Bill to tell him to pack the radio and get rid of it while I took off for awhile, but he seemed

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[illegible]
Operation Report
Chandler

to have urgent news he couldn't
give on the phone. So I set out
to shake my tails. Evidently I had
temporary success for I got to the
Room and Bill left with the
radio and had returned when
the same dicks that had tailed
me appeared at the door and
invited us to be their guests for
a while - which lasted for the
next E I G H T Hours
Before we were separated I told
H. Dickman where I had met
Dawson and that we had no other
connection and Bill evidently
stuck to the story for Peterson
nor Dickman ever got any
satisfaction out of our connection
or who we were with.
Finally Pete called me to one
side and very pleadingly asked
me to Please tell him that I was
with O.S.S., but I couldn't resist
the desire to tantalize his curiosity
and kept denying any connection
with or knowledge of O.S.S.

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[illegible]
[illegible]
Chandler

Finally Pete left and after a little came back in with triumph written all over his huge frame. He held a sheet of paper in his hand and read my name and serial number from Dawson's orders! I put on my best dumbfounded expression and yelled mistake, which was exactly right. I maintained the authenticity of my own orders and in short order we were on our way to La Bastille de San Diego. Things went a little irregular to our advantage - we were not mugged or printed, no records made, and put in the same cell which was as clean as a pin. We were even permitted to select our own cell!

On our way to the cell we let it be known that a Mr. Gervasi could be contacted who (we hoped) could furnish irreproachable corroboration of our story.

Cleanliness is a small virtue

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Abalone III
Operation Pepper
Chandler

For an enclosure 6 x 8 with a wash bowl and commode and glass smooth concrete floor, but much appreciated nevertheless. In five hours we had a multitude of visions of a certain Mr. Servass. We could see him in a dim lit bar, sitting on a chair, with a luscious bit of loveliness taking his soul into paradise while his mind strayed toward the nupital couch; or we could see a guy with a wide grin of delight saying "they'll be ok 'till Morning"; or a guy who had completely lost himself. The best sight of all, tho, was no apparition but the appearance of the real physical Servass at 2300 who performed a slick Corpus Delecti That opened the way to fresh air without one inch bars for filters.

A bite of chow at midnite after missing dinner and supper was a darned pleasant experience and a soft bed to sleep in wasn't a hour dream come true!

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[illegible] III
[illegible] Report
Chandler

3. June 2-0
A. Located [illegible] in the Pickwick Hotel
B. 1000 We walked down Broadway and found ourselves with a tail in a taxi. We split at the Hotel San Diego and I made the tail who turned out to be Lt. Deckman who had boasted the day before that he had never been made in 15 years of tailing. That probably accounted for the embarrassed expression he couldn't hide when I spoke to him in the hotel lobby. I went back toward the front via C st and saw no more of a tail
C. 1100 Went to the Navy Supply Base at end of Broadway St. and found no difficulty getting in even asking for a fictitious person. Went to the accounting Dept and had almost a two hour chat with a Mr. Keyes, chief of the accounting branch. A darned sharp guy where figures are concerned but dumb as an ox on security.

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Abstract III
Operation Report
Chandler

I fed Mr. Keyes, a man about 4 a year of age with a manner for an attention ever, a line about being out of the army recently and nearly fell out of my chair when I heard him say he had a son in the same outfit I had been talking about. He backed up everything I said as if he had personal knowledge! Through Mr. Keyes I was introduced to a navy Lt. Perry - Keyes took care of my cover story - who is in charge of the Coast Inspectors branch, and that inspects all work being done for the navy made an appointment to come back to see Lt. Perry tomorrow.

Introduced also to a Mr. Chapman a middle aged civilian in charge of disbursements at the navy Pier. He was very eager to explain what a tough job he had and how badly he needed help. But most of all he had to tell me where he sent supplies and what he sent when! And I was only shopping for a job - not working on it. Also met a Mr. Reiterman in the auditing department. time prevented exploiting this source.

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Adolphus III
Operation Report
Chandler

Met Bill shortly after 1400 for lunch and caught a cab for Ti Juana about 11.00
D. Had a damned expensive cab ride to the border. Other passenger got out at Rohr aircraft and I was soaked $4.50 from there to the border. Went through the border without incident by hesitating and shooting the breeze for a moment with the American Custom and Immigration Officers to see what they were checking for. Crossed the road to the Customs building where I met a Custom Patrol Sergeant who worked on the Texas border recently. By shooting him a line about owning the J-4 ranch and showing him my brand on my letterhead he was a dead duck. I was conducted on a tour of the building and then we went for a ride in the Sgt's Patrol car along the fence from Tijuana to the coast and from Ti Juana to the Hills about 20 miles east. Along the way the Sgt. Pointed out the places they paid the

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Operations Report
Chandler

Most attention to where dope was most frequently crossed and where the "wet backs" usually jumped the fence. He showed me how they "fushened" the trails and set traps to tell when someone came over. Also explained system of Patrol with Immigration Dept, how the fence came into being etc.

E. Left the Sgt. at the T. Juana border about 1900 and caught a cab to T. Juana. Stopped at a few of the bars and looked around and had a very delicious filet mignon at the ~~Camel~~ Caesar's Cafe. Stopped at the Chinese Bar on the Main St. and chatted with a bartender in Spanish and English and told him I was looking for some labor and he told me that every man who could get a passport had a good job but that there were a lot of men who couldn't get passports. I asked him to let me know if he saw anybody interested in work that I didn't care too much about a passport. After visiting several other bars I came back to the

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Operations Report
Chandler

Chinese Joint. Of course should be me
I was approached by a Mexican that
looked about 45. He was wearing a fairly
nice and reasonably clean dark brown
suit, a grey hat, and silver rimmed
full vue glasses. He was about 5'8" tall
and tended toward stickiness with a
broad, flat clean shaven face. He
started the conversation by asking me
if I lived in California and when I
told him I was from Texas he said he
used to live in Little Mexico in Dallas
Texas! Our acquaintance grew faster
since we both knew some of the same
people in Dallas. His name turned
out to be Raul Michel. He owns two
taxi cabs and seven Prostitutes in
Tijuana and a farm near Ensenada
about 55 miles from T. Juana. He took
me down to see his girls where there
must be at least 50 in all. He collects
half of what his girls make and considers
it very fair treatment.
I told Michel I was needing extra
help and he went to great length
to explain how difficult it is to get
help anyplace except below the
border. He also explained that just

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Abalone III
Operation Report
Chandler

a few could get Pass Ports
In a round about way he
told me that it was sometimes
Possible to get men over but it
would cost at least $100 a
man to swing the deal. When
I told him I was in the market
for 200 workers, Michel's eyes
fairly popped out of his head
and his attitude toward me
did a complete about face
not that it had been
anything but good heretofore.
He wouldn't even let me
open and close my own
car door.

Michel knew a woman in
San Diego who knows a bookie
in Tijuana and Ensenada whose
name he couldn't remember, but
this bookie could put him in
contact with a man who

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Abalone [illegible]
Operations
Chandler

has a lot of freedom in crossing the border and is well known and respected by all the officers. After expressing doubt that that many men could possibly be moved over the border, Michel assured me it could be done with complete safety to myself. that if any of the men got caught they would not know who they were going to see.

When I started home about 2300, Michel insisted on driving me back to my Hotel. On the way back he told me how to get a turist Permit to use in case I wanted to go into Mexico. I made an appointment to meet Michel at 1430 Thursday and turned in after a very busy day.

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Abstract [illegible]
Copy [illegible]
Chandler.

4. June 21 Up by 0830
and out to see a Dr. Pazz
in the Bank of America Bldg to
get a Tourist's Visa. A very
amiable but crafty old Fox.
Got Visa with a lot of lying
and 5 bucks - notary fee
and all.
With Pazz's vouching for me
deposited a phony check for
$350 with Bank of America in
exchange for travelers checks
Suckers everywhere I turn.
1030 - Went back to Broadway
Pier to see Lt. Perry
Hotell for bait to show that
he knew something that
wasn't general knowledge -
He knows that Rohr's Jet
plane will not be accepted
by the navy because of operational
failures of the ship's exhaust
and landing gear.

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[illegible]

Also talked to Capt Woodruff who told me all about his internal security set up and offered me a job as a guard. Lt. Graham (navy) in same office told me how I could get by every guard on the base to impress me with the importance of his work. Never a word as to who I was or where from.

1330 Had lunch with Bill who is going to lose the air part where the friendly natives work. Some luck finding a beautiful native who happens to be secretary to the C.O.!

1430 Met Michel as per agreement. He had other business till 1630 meet at San Diego Hotel Lobby.

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Abalone Inn
Ocean Resort
Chandler

Caught cab way to hell out to see a Mrs. Thomas Durham who operates a subtle sex agency called the San Diego Social Club. Only every readily available was that of a lonely guy looking for shack, so it led into a $10 membership in the club which was paid with a phony check. Booxie turned out to be Eddie House - lives in Tijuana - never bet on a horse in my life!

Took the name of my date for Saturday nite who is supposed to have everything including a car, private apartment, and lots of stamina. Went back to town and met Michel and took off for Tijuana - no trouble at

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Abalone [illegible]
oper. report
Chandler

border. Went to Hanse's house & found he was in Ensenada - Michel made a phone call and said he had the information he wanted.

We drove to Ensenada - a very beautiful drive and a nice little town in a valley. Went to a guy's house who owns a gasoline tank truck and after Michel talked to him prevail for a long time I was showed a very ingenious contraption for moving hot stuff across the border. One of the compartments of the gasoline truck was converted to a dry material or personnel carrier. Truck goes all the way to Long Beach for gasoline at times. Wants $200 to bring a man across!

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Operation [illegible]
Chandler

too much so didn't make
a trade.
Came back to Figueroa after
having dinner in the Hidalgo
Hotel Cafe at Michel's expense.
Some very fancy mexican chow.
If my dear Raul ever once
realizes what a dam sucker
he's being made! My neck!
On way back Michel wanted
to close the deal and start
the men across but I
wasn't even sure he could
get a man across in
the first place so a deal
was made where I would
give him my check for $1000
and he would have ten men
across the border within
three hours after he got
them located. I made
the check out but it was

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[illegible]
Operation [illegible]
Chandler

getting late, I argued and most good men would be in bed and he would need some time to select the right kind of labor. I explained I had to have at least 75% trained in ranch work and the other 25% could learn.

I told Michel I was going to finish my vacation out here and that I would see him again or send someone in my place in about two weeks.

If someone else contacts him my name, where I'm from, and the name of my ranch will identify him to Michel. Michel can be contacted at the Chinese [illegible] on Main St or by going to the Whore house over in

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the north eastern part
of town.
2200 left Sr. Raul Michel
at the border after retrieving
my phony check and
shot the breeze with the
border officials for a short
time.
My friend, the border patrol Sgt.
got me a ride back to town
with a very attractive native
driving a '41 Pontiac Coupe.
the ride proved very interesting
and eventful. With a
few more days a real
target could be developed.
Reluctantly hit the sack
at 0100.

5. June 22:
Checked out of the Pickwick
and left forwarding addresses
for Mexico City, just in
case anybody might be interested

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22 [illegible]

Boarded 10 30 bus for the Arches with a gen for at least two more weeks or another trip.

Conclusions, Observations, recommendations, and bitching

My cover was entirely adequate for any normal situation but it failed miserably when a good policeman went to work on it. Extra effort should be made to insure that phony documents are at least editorially correct. Every effort should be made to cultivate the police agencies but STAY AWAY officially. The cop on the beat has about as much information as the chief and its a dam site easier to obtain from the lower brackets

Target planning before the casing actually begins is a great

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Abalone III
Operation Rex
Chandler

help in cutting out irrelevant stuff and prevents overlooking essential information.
I found myself at first too Corr-Conscious - too eager to explain the slightest query - that is not natural and I managed to get over it. Was one of my undoings, tho, in the affair with the police department.
If an agent is going to test his corr, suggest it be tried at the end rather than the beginning of the problem.

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Nahum Bernstein

200 W 70

William H. Daniel Maj.
204 So Gregory
Alexandria Va.

Keep attached to file

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CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] August 1945

[illegible] FOR THE SECRETARY, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

In response to your memorandum of 3 August 1945 addressed to the Director of Strategic Services, I am enclosing two copies of our letter dated 4 August 1945 to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. One copy is for your information and files, and the other for transmittal to the AC of S, [illegible], War Department General Staff.

For and in the absence of the Director:

[illegible]
[illegible]
Assistant Director

Enclosures

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CONFIDENTIAL

4 August 1945

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

Prior to his departure overseas, General Donovan instructed me to cause a thorough investigation to be made of the matters described in your letter to him of 13 July 1945 and to communicate the results of this investigation to you.

For reasons which are apparent, it is the policy of this agency never to allow any of its personnel to represent himself as a member of any branch or department of the government, unless by consent of the department concerned. Specific orders to insure that this policy would be carried out were in effect long prior to the incident which was the subject of your letter.

In the present case, investigation has disclosed that in a number of important respects the facts have not been correctly reported to you. There were nevertheless certain statements made by the student concerned to Chief Peterson, of the San Diego Police Department, which were not wholly in accord with our policy. This was due to the fact that

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the instructor in charge of this particular class of students, Mr. Nahum Bernstein, was suddenly given a brief leave of absence on account of the death of his father, and the training exercise in question was carried out under a new instructor, Ensign Court H. SerVaas, USNR, who shortly thereafter left for overseas duty. The circumstances were as follows:

Specific notification of the proposed exercises, including both the real and assumed names of the students, had been given to the FBI representative in the area, Mr. Murphy, also the County Sheriff, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Immigration Authorities, and the Office of the Provost Marshall. For a long period of time each of these offices had been informed of the nature and purpose of these exercises and had been given notification in advance of the time and place each exercise would be held, and the names of the students. We had in this instance, as we always had, their complete cooperation and support.

The student involved in the conversation with Chief Peterson was 1st Lieutenant William P. Chambers, AUS. The other student who was held (merely because he was occupying the same hotel room as Lieut. Chambers) was not Mr. John H. Andrews, but 2nd Lieutenant William E. Lawson, AUS.

At no time did Lieut. Chambers have in his possession or show to Chief Peterson any papers signed by or referring to the "Director of Military Intelligence". Lieut. Chambers obtained

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an interview with Chief Peterson and showed him ordinary travel orders in the usual form for military personnel, purportedly signed by the Adjutant General, which was the only paperwhich the Lieutenant had. The only reference to Military Intelligence occurred in the course of Lieut. Chambers' conversation with Chief Peterson when the latter asked the latter if he was a member of Military Intelligence, and the Lieutenant replied that he was working "with" them. Lieutenant Chambers also told Chief Peterson that he was at that time assigned to the corps of Military Police, Investigative Section.

Lieut. Chambers states that it is true that he told Chief Peterson that he had acquaintance with certain personnel of the FBI. Lieut. Chambers further states, however, that in each case he did in fact have acquaintance with each of the individuals named, and that he made no misrepresentation in this respect. Lieut. Chambers had in fact been a police officer in civilian lif, although he was not a graduate of the National Police Academy.

It further appears that in the course of the conversation, Chief Peterson suspected that the Lieutenant was a member of OSS, and when the Lieutenant refused to admit, he turned the Lieutenant over to the Military Police who, as I have stated, were fully informed and who got in tuch with OSS officials in the area so that the men might be identified and released.

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It appears from our entire investigation that Lieut. Chambers at no time represented that he ever was a member of the FBI or that the FBI was interested in the matter which he was discussing with Chief Peterson.

It does appear, however, that the Lieutenant in claiming that he was working "with Military Intelligence" and was assigned to the Corps of Military Police, went beyond the limitations which this agency has imposed upon student personnel in training for overseas service. It further appears that this was occasioned by the fact that the Briefing by the temporary instructor was not as complete as it should have been.

In view of the foregoing, we have taken steps to insure that all briefing in the future will be reviewed before execution by senior instructors. Chief Peterson has been fully advised of our activities in this regard, and I am informed is now cooperating wholeheartedly with this agency, as are the local representatives of the FBI, ONI, the Office of the Provost Marshall, and other law-enforcement agencies in the area.

One who is not familiar with our full training program, and the conditions under which our students operate overseas, might misinterpret these particular exercises.

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In view, however, of the experiences of our personnel who have operated overseas, including the interrogations by the enemy of some who have been captured, we plan to continue these exercises as a part of our training pro program.

Very truly yours,

W. C. Doering, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Assistant Director

The details contained herein relating to my interview with Chief Peterson & the San Diego, Cal. Police Dept. are true.

William P. Chambers
1st Lt. C.A.C.

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To: Mr. Cheston

The letter of 13 July that the General received from the FBI was referred to Colonel Doering on 18 July. As far as I know it has not been answered

WJD.

OSS Form 3054 Director's Office
(3308)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-2746
3 August 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

The enclosed photostatic copy of a letter from the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation to G-2 of the War Department General Staff is forwarded for your information and appropriate action.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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COPY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 11, 1946

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Major General Clayton Bissell
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

I have learned of a situation involving the activities of representatives of the Office of Strategic Services in San Diego which I desire to bring to your attention as of possible interest to you.

On June 18, 1946, an individual giving his name as Paul Chandler called on the Chief of Police of San Diego, California, Mr. Clifford E. Peterson. Chandler represented himself as a Captain of Military Police who had just arrived in San Diego on the orders of the Director of Military Intelligence to investigate certain confidential matters in that area involving U. S. Army personnel. Chandler produced a purported letter of transfer ordering him to proceed from Washington, D. C., to San Diego, California, to carry out a confidential assignment. This letter bore the purported signature of the Director of Military Intelligence. Other than a serial number, Chandler had no other credentials or means of identification. Chandler asserted his investigation was concerned with certain leaks of confidential information which had come to light in Argentina and that the belief was entertained this information may have been taken across the Mexican Border by Army personnel.

Chandler requested Chief Peterson to furnish the identities of individuals in the San Diego area and below the Mexican Border who might be able to assist him with his investigation. Chandler further stated he could not consider approaching any Army authorities in that area because of what he described as the extremely confidential nature of his investigation.

Chief Peterson devoted approximately two hours to conferring with Chandler in an effort to satisfy himself concerning Chandler's identity. He was anxious, of course, to cooperate with Chandler if his mission was legitimate and if he was, in fact, a representative of the Military Intelligence Service. Apparently in a further effort to substantiate his identity, Chandler claimed acquaintance with a number of representatives of this Bureau and with a number of police officers in the Dallas, Texas, Police Department. Chandler also claimed to be a graduate of the FBI National Police Academy.

Acting on the belief that Chandler was an impersonator, Chief Peterson subsequently had him placed under arrest. One John M. Andrews, found in the company of Chandler at the time of his arrest, was also detained. As of possible additional interest to you, Andrews had in his possession certain cards detaching

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Major General Clayton Bissell
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

himself and five others from active duty in the Army effective July 2nd. Chandler's name also appeared on this list, and it was found that the serial numbers of both Chandler and Andrews were identical on these documents. In view of the obviously forged nature of the papers possessed by these individuals and because of their apparent connection with the armed forces, they were turned over to the Military Police by the San Diego Police Department. It was ascertained that Chandler, was, in fact, a representative of OSS undergoing training in San Diego and that Andrews had a similar status.

There is no doubt but that Chandler's story was a complete fabrication and that this fantastic incident in its entirety had its origin in the somewhat bizarre methods frequently used by OSS in its training program. I realize, of course, that this individual was not acting under your instructions, but, in view of the nature of the pretexts used and the false representations made concerning the alleged connection with your office, I thought you would be interested in this information. I am personally concerned about an incident of this type which, though not the responsibility of representatives of the domestic intelligence agencies, nevertheless creates the danger of damage being done to the excellent relations and cooperation normally enjoyed by them in their contacts with local police officials.

I am bringing these facts to the attention of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services suggesting the apparent impropriety of the pretexts utilized in this case.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER
John Edgar Hoover
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SCHOOLS AND TRAINING BRANCH
2521 E STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 July 1945

TO: Director, OSS

SUBJECT: Report from J. Edgar Hoover Re Paul Chandler

In my memorandum of yesterday to you on the above subject I said we would ask Lt.Col. Philip K. Allen to contact the FBI Office in San Diego and ascertain whether or not they knew of the report which had been made to Headquarters FBI. This morning we received a TWX from Lt.Col. Allen as follows:

"Telephone call with Murphy, San Diego, reveals that this office wrote letter to big boy concerning trainees use of government agency. They knew he was on project but felt that use of such agency should be reported. I do not understand attitude because they have been completely briefed. Nevertheless though away at the time, Murphy backed office decision, and I agree with him on this. Hereafter, no such story will be used by any trainee. Chief Peterson most cooperative and has been since episoded. There is not repeat no friction between any government agencies on West Coast, nor has there been nor will there be. All under control. Under circumstances, however, Murphy cannot send TWX to big boy"

The last sentence of this TWX refers to a suggestion that if the report had not come from Mr. Murphy's office they might TWX Mr. Hoover informing him that they were aware of our plans.

AINSWORTH BLOCK,
Lt.Col.,Infantry,
Executive Officer.

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15 July 1943

Director, OSS

Report from J. Edgar Hoover Re Paul Chandler

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The last sentence of this TWX refers to a suggestion that if the report had not come from Mr. Murphy's office they might TWX Mr. Hoover informing him that they were aware of our plans.

AINSWORTH BLOCK,
Lt.Col., Infantry,
Executive Officer.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SCHOOLS AND TRAINING BRANCH
[redacted] STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 July 1945

TO: The Director, OSS

SUBJECT: Report from J. Edgar Hoover re Paul Chandler

1. The letter which you forwarded to us from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, was the first intimation that this headquarters had of any unusual occurrence in connection with our activities on the west coast. We immediately telephoned to Lt. Col. Philip K. Allen, Chief, S&T/Pacific Coast Area, and secured from him the details of what had happened.

2. This incident occurred during one of the scheduled "schemes" periodically held by the Schools & Training Branch for the training of students on the west coast. These schemes are run in several different localities in California and a number of them have been put on in San Diego. Mr. Murphy, who is in charge of FBI in that area, had been notified of our intended plan of operation and was aware that several of our students were working on a scheme. "Chandler" is an assumed name under which one student was working, as is "Andrews", who accompanied him. The plan, as outlined prior to the start of the scheme, was identical with that outlined in Mr. Hoover's letter, and the documents and other identification carried by Chandler and Andrews were prepared and supplied by ourselves. Chief Peterson, of the San Diego police, was not aware of the scheme at this time, although as a result of his arrest of these two men, he was taken into our confidence and has since been working enthusiastically with us. As mentioned above, Mr. Murphy of the FBI had been notified, as had the county sheriff, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Immigration authorities, and the Provost Marshal, Captain Chapin, of the military police.

3. When Chief Peterson turned the two men over to the military police, they immediately notified us and in accordance with their usual practice, released the men to us. Colonel Allen was much surprised that word of the incident had reached FBI headquarters for, as indicated, Mr. Murphy has always been notified of our schemes and works closely with us. Presumably, Chief Peterson may have written direct to the FBI for, as stated, he was not at that time working with us. We have asked Colonel Allen to contact the FBI and ascertain whether or not they knew of this report, and as soon as information is received it will be forwarded to you.

4. It should be pointed out that this is not the first time that our students have been arrested during the operation of our schemes. The local police, FBI, ONI, sheriff, and military police are always instructed to treat our men as ordinary prisoners and to attempt to secure from them all possible information regarding their operations. After they have carried out this part of the program on any men apprehended, the men are

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then turned over to an officer from our headquarters on the ward beat and the incident is considered closed. So far as we know, there was nothing unusual about the Chandler-Andrews incident, but we regret exceedingly that we have been placed in an unfavorable light with Mr. Hoover.

5. If there are any other points regarding these schemes which you would like, I will be glad to have one of the training staff go over them in detail with you.

AINSWORTH BLOCH
Lt. Col., Inf.
Executive Officer

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17 July 1945

The Director, [redacted]

Report from J. Edgar Hoover re Paul Chandler

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AIRSWORTH BLOOD
Lt. Col., Inf.
Executive Officer

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

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

July 15, 1946

Major General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

I have learned of a situation involving the activities of representatives of the Office of Strategic Services at San Diego which I desire to bring to your attention.

On June 19, 1946, an individual giving his name as Paul Chandler called on the Chief of Police of San Diego, California, Mr. Clifford E. Peterson. Chandler represented himself as a Captain of Military Police who had just arrived in San Diego on the orders of the Director of Military Intelligence to investigate certain confidential matters in that area involving U. S. Army personnel. Chandler produced a purported letter of transfer ordering him to proceed from Washington, D. C., to San Diego, California, to carry out a confidential assignment. This letter bore the purported signature of the Director of Military Intelligence. Other than a serial number, Chandler had no other credentials or means of identification. Chandler asserted his investigation was concerned with certain leaks of confidential information which had come to light in Argentina and that the belief was entertained this information may have been taken across the Mexican Border by Army personnel.

Chandler requested Chief Peterson to furnish the identities of individuals in the San Diego area and below the Mexican Border who might be able to assist him with his investigation. Chandler further stated he could not consider approaching any Army authorities in that area because of what he described as the extremely confidential nature of his investigation.

Chief Peterson devoted approximately two hours to conferring with Chandler in an effort to satisfy himself concerning Chandler's identity. He was anxious, of course, to cooperate with Chandler if his mission was legitimate and if he was, in fact, a representative of the Military Intelligence Service. In a further effort to substantiate his identity, Chandler claimed acquaintance with a number of officials of this Bureau and certain police officers of Dallas, Texas. Also, Chandler claimed he was a graduate of the FBI National Police Academy, apparently attempting to capitalize on the fact that Chief Peterson is a graduate of that institution.

As a result of the representations of Chandler, which Chief Peterson became convinced were false, he subsequently had Chandler placed under arrest. One John H. Andrews, found in the company of Chandler at the time of his arrest, was also held. Certain documents found in the possession

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of these individuals, while obviously false, indicated, however, they were connected with the Army. Both were turned over to the Military Police. It was ascertained that Chandler was not connected with the Military Intelligence Service but that both he and Andrews were, in fact, members of OSS in training at San Diego. Relative to Chandler's representation that he was a graduate of the FBI National Police Academy, the records of this Bureau reflect this claim to be false.

While I realize that this incident very likely had its origin in the training program of your agency, I want to suggest to you the impropriety of the pretexts utilized in this case. I am personally concerned by a situation of this type which goes so far toward creating the danger of damage being done to the excellent relations and cooperation normally enjoyed by the domestic intelligence agencies and their contacts of an official nature with local police officials.

In view of these considerations, I felt that you would want to be informed of these developments.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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To: Mrs O'Donnell

For file

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service

(86361)

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To: Col. Doering

RUSH

Please take this up with Schools and Training. Evidently they do not see the unwisdom of making use of such a device as pretending to be an FBI.

7/13/45

OSS Form 3054 (3308) Director's office

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Brig. Gen. John Magruder

DATE: 20 July, 1945

FROM : Ferdinand L. Mayer

SUBJECT:

A conversation in the sense of the attached memorandum of July 18 was had with General Holmes on July 19.

In addition I observed that I had no doubt that General Homes was concerned with the fact that a national crime detective agency such as the F.B.I. was branching out into international intelligence activities, that this was not only opposed to our ideas of the conduct of government but incidentally was very vulnerable politically in the United States.

General Holmes stated that he was strongly of this same opinion, that he had wished very much to be able to present the situation to a Secretary of State but there had practically been no one available in that office for months with whom he could sit down and go into this important matter. General Holmes hoped to take this up with Mr. Byrnes as soon as practicable.

In further discussion with the F.B.I. matter, I mentioned the fact which Mr. Murphy of X-2 had given me, that the F.B.I. were not keeping to the understanding with regard to liaison arrangements but were establishing their connections themselves. General Holmes was much interested in this, took a note of it and said he would cable Merle Cochran, in Paris I assume, to check on this.

I took the opportunity to ask General Holmes how he felt the F.B.I. work had been in South America. The reply was that the work on the whole had been quite good but they consistently showed the results of their training for criminal detection and the pursuit of an individual rather than with the obtaining of information either generally or specifically.

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14 July, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Julius C. Holmes, Asst. Sec. of State

FROM: Ferdinand L. Mayer, Special Asst. to Director, OSS

Mr. Mundy of FC recently telephoned my office to say that it was necessary for the F.B.I. representative in Spain to undertake a mission outside that country, after which it would be advisable for him to return to the United States for consultation. During his absence from Spain the F.B.I. would like to send a replacement in order that there should be continuity in their work. Mr. Mundy asked if OSS had any objection to this replacement.

OSS has no objection, provided this replacement comes within the scope of the conditions agreed upon by A. A. Berle on November 3, 1943, among which it was understood that the F.B.I. would undertake no operations in respect of subversive elements in Spain except as authorized by and under the control of the A-2 organization. Furthermore, it was understood that the F.B.I. representative in Spain would be on a temporary status, to remain only so long as the special situation in the Argentine requires his presence there.

Although concurring in this replacement, should you deem it necessary and desirable, I would at the same time invite attention to the underlined phrases above stated which I believe represent your own views.

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To: General Magruder

Miss Feldman suggested that I send you these memos in connection with our relations with the FBI and State Dept

Jan 12 2 40 PM '45

Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
(330a)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan DATE: 16 May, 1945

FROM : Richard Southgate RS

SUBJECT:

In accordance with your suggestion, I told General Holmes that you did not wish to oppose the appointment of FBI representatives to the staff of the American Embassy in Paris, although you felt very definitely that such representatives should perform only duties consistent with the law enforcement functions of their organization. I pointed out that there seemed to be a tendency on the part of the FBI to expand its activities all over Europe and to have representatives attached to every Embassy and Legation. I said I wondered whether this was a situation which the Department wished to have developed and slowly become a permanent one.

General Holmes stated positively that he did not wish this to occur. He felt that FBI representatives in Europe should be attached to Embassies and Legations only for limited periods of time and for specific purposes. He said that he would immediately undertake a review of the whole situation in this regard and would take appropriate steps to see that his views as outlined above were made effective.

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To: Mr. SOUTHGATE

WJD

8 May 1945

RECEIVED
MAY 10 1945
R. S.

Director's Office

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 May 1945

To

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy

Mr. Smith-Gate

Following comments were made on the subject of the attached memorandum from Mr. Southgate:

1) This is simply an extension of the program Mr. Hoover has been undertaking for a long time to establish an intelligence network in Europe, which I feel must be considered in that light.

2) Mr. Hoover does not stick to facts when he says that the agents to be attached to the Embassy in Paris "will function strictly in a liaison capacity as to the Special Agents assigned to the other American establishments at London, Lisbon and Madrid". The agents at those places do not confine themselves to liaison activities.

3) I am interested in Mr. Hoover's statement that "hardly an espionage case arises in the United States that does not have some phase of its activity located in France which necessitates inquiry if we are properly to complete the matter". We have always made that same statement both in SI and CE work leading into South America but apparently Mr. Hoover feels that the argument applies only to FBI.

4) FBI already has three representatives in Paris, not attached to the Embassy. In many respects they duplicate the work of X-2.

5) I recommend that we oppose any further appointments of FBI men to Embassy positions in Europe until our own relationships are clarified, at which time it may be entirely appropriate to have FBI men, but to have them keep strictly within their proper bounds.

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

to: Mr. James Murphy

For comment and return.

W.J.D.

5 MAY 1945

Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
(3308)

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Major General William J. Donovan

FROM : Richard Southgate

DATE: 7 May, 1945

SUBJECT:

You will recall that some time ago the State Department received a cable from Ambassador Caffery in Paris requesting assignment of two FBI men to the staff of the Embassy in Paris. The State Department requested our approval of this arrangement. You indicated to me that you would have no objection provided the work to be undertaken by these FBI men was to be within the proper sphere of FBI activities in Europe and you expressed the opinion that the Department of Justice should set this forth in writing and not merely orally to Mr. Caffery.

There is now attached a copy of a letter which I have just received addressed to Mr. Lyon from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover which, I should judge, meets your requirements. I should be glad to pass on to the State Department any comment which you may wish to make in the circumstance.

SECRET

To James Murphy

For comment

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

April 16, 1945

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Mr. Frederick B. Lyon
Chief
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Freddy:

Reference is made to your request for a general outline of the duties expected to be performed by representatives of this Bureau in the event they are attached to the Staff of the American Embassy at Paris, France.

It is expected that these Agents will function strictly in a liaison capacity as do the Special Agents assigned to the other American establishments at London, England; Lisbon, Portugal; and Madrid, Spain, so that they will be able to coordinate the interests of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the other agencies in the French theater.

The primary purpose of such liaison assignments is to secure information on various targets in France through these agencies arising out of and necessary for the proper functioning of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in various Western Hemisphere cases. Hardly an espionage case arises in the United States that does not have some phase of its activity located in France which necessitates inquiry if we are to properly complete the matter.

Undoubtedly, you are aware of the similar vital interests of the FBI in many cases arising in the treason field involving such American citizens as Jane Anderson, Robert Henry Best and Douglas Chandler who with four others are being sought by this Bureau under treason indictments returned in the District of Columbia on July 6, 1943, and special well-known individual cases of American citizens such as Donald Day and Joseph Lincoln Laham, who are presently physically collaborating with and working for the enemy. The tremendous problem of displaced persons, which include individuals wanted by this Bureau in connection with subversive activities against the United States, at the present time is such that it is entirely possible that these individuals can escape unless some coordination is evolved which will permit the interests of the FBI to be represented on the scene, particularly since the volume and speed of the screening precludes action without such representation.

Should you desire any additional information concerning this matter, please advise me and I will be only too glad to furnish it.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General William J. Donovan Wash. D March, 1944

FROM : Richard Southgate

SUBJECT:

In the course of a conversation at the State Department this morning Mr. Jack Neal, Assistant Chief of Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, told me that Mr. Caffery in Paris had sent in a request for the Department's approval for the assignment to Paris (either as members of the Embassy staff or as American officials abroad on Government business) of two F.B.I. men. The reason given for this request was that the F.B.I. desired to use the services of these men in connection with the prosecution of renegade Americans in Germany, such as some of those individuals who have been broadcasting over Nazi radio stations. The other reason given was to secure information and evidence in connection with the prosecution of Nazi sympathizers in the United States.

Mr. Neal said that the Department is entirely agreeable to the appointment, provided O.S.S. has no objection and asked me to ascertain our views.

I inquired how it happened that the request came from Mr. Caffery rather than from the F.B.I. here in Washington. Mr. Neal said that Mr. Caffery had worked very closely with the F.B.I. when he was Ambassador to Brazil and that the F.B.I. had presumably taken the matter

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up with him and had got him to make the request.

Will you be good enough to let me know what reply should be made to Mr. Neal.

c.c. General John Magruder

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OSS
Form 59 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE January 2, 1945

FROM

PARIS, FRANCE

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 180

(FOR ACTION)

X-2 F.B.I. 15,942

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, DOERING, MAGRUDER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—87000-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

FBI?

#5094. SAINT. From JJ/001.

Were notified by SHAEF today that 3 additional FBI men en route Paris through arrangement with Bissell and SHAEF to perform 3 functions. They are: (1) investigation renegade American case; (2) channeling to FBI all CI material relating to enemy cases or activities Western Hemisphere; (3) observing of Communist activities in Europe with particular emphasis Germany later and forwarding such information for American FOEBWS (sic) at home. Last 2 purposes represent definite extension but see no possibility limiting their activities unless steps initiated Washington. This for your information only and not action this time.

FILE COPY

SECRET

TOR: 1/2/45 5:38 PM

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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Date

To: General Donovan

This just came to light. Has all desired action been taken?

RT

✓

Office of the Executive Officer

(30489)

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12/16

Mrs. Tenks says this appeared on her desk and asks if it has been taken care of. Mrs. O'D has nothing on it.

PCH

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

[illegible] November [illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

FROM: James R. Murphy

Paris Saint Cable #1[illegible]7 (In [illegible]4177) dated October 29 again raises the question of the status and jurisdiction of FBI in areas other than the Western Hemisphere. We have watched them encroach in London, Lisbon, Madrid and in Italy. They now have two representatives in Paris under SHAEF protection. I am informed that FBI is sending ten men to the Philippines and that further agents are being trained especially for work in the Far East. These things, together with their announced intention and desire to get into the foreign field after the war, are beginning to present a problem upon which OSS should take a firm position. After their work in South America I think we are in a fairly good position to raise the question and to object to these encroachments, for I feel that we would be supported by both [illegible] and State officially.

The Paris cable indicates that SHAEF is requesting instructions from Washington on the FBI jurisdiction in ETO. I assume the matter will come before the Joint Chiefs. This might be an excellent opportunity to have the entire problem dealt with and decided. At any rate, it would do no harm to have someone at the JCS informed of the situation.

J. R. Murphy
J. R. M.

Nick
Take this up with Gridley - and then see if we should write.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Robert Thrun

DATE: April 14, 1946

FROM: Weston Howland

SUBJECT: FBI request (thru Horace Peters of X-2) for names and locations of OSS personnel in Mexico, West Indies including Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Central and South America.

Mr. Francis Barker, Administrative Officer of SI, confirmed to Sexton of my office, Mr. Whitney Shepherdson's statement, when informed by Mr. Barker of the FBI request, that there are no SI people in the territory in question.

Mr. Barker, specifically affirmed this date, when specifically questioned by Sexton, that there are no SI-Labor personnel now operating in the above described field.

Weston Howland
Security Officer

by direction

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As of April 5, 944.

% Fleet P.O.
New York, N.Y.

All USNR

Lt. Comdr. Gregg W. Toland
Lieut. Ralph O. Hoge
Chief Specialist Edward J. Garvin
Chief Specialist Harold A. Root
Sp. 1c. Robert A. Krasnow
Sp. 2c. Walter C. Nemeta
Sp. 2c. James W. Saper
Sp. 2c. Harold M. Slott

All Field Photo

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Medlicott, Thomas O.
Lawrence, John B. USNR
Hatfield, Wm R. USNR
Butt, Robert L. USCG
Taylor, Harry Don USCG
Shepner, E. USMC
Soltau, Gordon Leroy USNR
Radke, Robert USCG
Kimball, Richard S. USCG
Dennatto, Gerald L. USNR
Anderson, Orville W. USCG
Beck, Rollo USCG
Donahue, Frank USNR
Nikolenko, Nicholas USCG
Bodine, Leslie Leonard USMC
Barnhill, Leonard Loren USNR
Hobbs, Robert K. USCG
English, Frank Taylor USNR
Christenson, Warren Roberts USNR
Kenworthy, Robert Ernest USNR
Risser, Gordon K. USCG

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Robert Thrun

FROM : James R. Murphy

SUBJECT:

DATE: April 17, 1954

In reply to your request for names of any X-2 personnel located in the Western Hemisphere other than within the continental limits of the United States, please be advised that there are no members of this branch or any people associated with the branch, directly or indirectly, in that area at the present time.

SECRET 1954 APR 19 PM 3 09

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 April 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Executive Officer, OSS

THROUGH: Executive Officer, SSO

FROM: Personnel Officer, SSO

SUBJECT: Location of Personnel

1. This is to certify that no personnel of SSO Staff, SO, MO, and OG are at this time in South America, Central America, Mexico, and the West Indies, including Cuba.

2. It is understood that the Maritime Unit is covered in a separate report.

Chas. F. Eubank
Major, Ord.

APPROVED:

Edward L. Bigelow
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Executive Officer, SSO

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11 February 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 11 January 1944.

Our organization did bring to the attention of your bureau alleged espionage contacts in the United States of Liberto Lage Guerra Tavares. We never had reason to believe, however, that Clayton E. Booker had any connection with these alleged contacts in the United States. He has never been our employee.

We did suggest to representatives of your Bureau that formal proceedings against the woman should be temporarily delayed. Our representative understood from your people that they were in full accord, and that a better purpose might be served if this woman were given an opportunity to give further information to your bureau voluntarily, before formal proceedings were undertaken.

In view of your belief that further voluntary questioning of either Tavares of Booker would be fruitless, we will of course withdraw our suggestion. If you believe that Grand Jury proceedings should be had, we will offer no objection.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

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11 February 1944

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

We are enclosing a copy of a letter to the Honorable J. Edgar Hoover, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is self-explanatory. We feel sure that if it is decided to proceed further in this matter it will be done in such a manner as to protect the essential security of this agency.

We will be available at all times for any further discussions with you which you may desire.

Sincerely,

Weston Howland
Security Officer

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3 January 1944.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U. S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In the absence of General Donovan, I should like to thank you for your memorandum of 30 December 1943, enclosing information recently received by your Bureau concerning the exploitation of White Russians in the Far East.

I am sure that this material will be of value to us and we are very happy to have received it.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.

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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. Buxton. DATE: 1 January 1944.

FROM: Secretariat.

SUBJECT:

There is attached a reply to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover thanking him for a memorandum which he sent to us concerning the exploitation of White Russians in the Far East for espionage activities. Copies of the memorandum have been distributed to Mr. Shepardson, Dr. Langer and Maj. MacDonough.

C.I.D.

C. A. Bane,
Lieut. (jg), USNR

RECEIVED JAN 3 1944

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F. B. I. 1223.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Date: December 30 1943

To: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: EXPLOITATION OF WHITE RUSSIANS IN FAR EAST FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

There is being submitted herewith information recently received by this Bureau from a reliable source abroad concerning the exploitation of White Russians in the Far East for espionage activities. It is believed that this information may be of assistance to you.

Enc.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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WHITE RUSSIANS - ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

White Russians are widely scattered. After the collapse, by 1920, of armed resistance within Russia, what remained of the armed forces of Denikin, Wrangel and Kolchak fled with civilian refugees to all parts of the world. The number who escaped has been placed as high as two million and it was certainly not less than one million. By far the greater number of exiles found their way to the Far East where in Manchuria and on the China seaboard they have eked out a precarious existence not far removed from destitution. Other groups settled in the Middle East, while considerable numbers found sanctuary in Western Europe and the Americas. It is evident the position of the comparatively prosperous Americanized Russian is so different from the many thousands of his fellow Russians living under coolie conditions in the Orient that any generalization on the loyalties of White Russians is rendered difficult.

While there will be found in every White Russian community both the fascist and the Democrat, the political sympathies of the majority in any one community appear in general to be actuated by their political and economic environment.

In no place is this more clearly evidenced than in the Far East, where, in view of their numerical strength - they probably number close on 300,000 - and the proximity of their homeland, White Russians are in a position of political importance not attained elsewhere. It is because of this that the Japanese have sought to control and use them in their drive against Soviet and other foreign interests in East Asia. Rigid control of their press, intimidation and even assassination of their officials, bribery and corruption of their loyalties have made White Russians in the Orient largely amenable to Japanese wishes. Japanese policy towards White Russian communities under their protection has been a mixture of "kicks and ha'pence" and the poor economic status has made the Russian emigre, as elsewhere, peculiarly susceptible to the "ha'pence". It follows that his services as an agent can be cheaply bought by the Japanese authorities and for that reason it has always been necessary to view him with considerable suspicion.

Already in 1918-19 the Japanese, favoring a separatist regime under Japanese influence in Eastern Siberia, were sponsoring the Cossack leader, Semenov, in his refusal to recognize the authority of Kolchak, who was then engaged in fighting the Bolsheviks in Siberia. Later Semenov became an important Japanese agent but in recent years his Cossack counter-revolutionary organization, which has been active in Manchukuo in organizing the Russian emigres for Japanese purposes, has gradually been displaced in influence and authority by an organization more in keeping with the times, the Russian Fascist Union.

The R.F.U. which is run on Nazi lines with the Swastika and the Russian Imperial Eagle as its emblem, propounds a programme in full harmony with the totalitarian principles of National Socialism. With Japanese backing, the Union is controlled from its headquarters in Harbin by General K. V. Rodzaevsky, a White Russian political adventurer who does not shun the use of blackmail and intimidation for financing himself and his organization and who, with Japanese connivance, had honeycombed Manchukuo with his White Russian agents. These agents find convenient cover along the railways and in important buildings in the country.

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Visa Division, Department of State

The activities of the [illegible] in Japanese [illegible] subordinated to and controlled by the Russian Emigrants' [illegible] Central Emigrants' Committee in North China. The role of [illegible] between White Russians and the Japanese authorities [illegible] head of the Manchukuo Bureau is General Kisiltsin, [illegible] Kisiltsin is reported to be heavily subsidized by the Japanese [illegible] proclaim his hatred of the Soviet and his pro-Axis sympathies. [illegible] North China Committee, has been equally [illegible] Japanese [illegible] the same reasons. Since White Russians have no [illegible] Japanese authorities except as represented by [illegible] the control over the whole emigration by [illegible]

Apparently overriding these [illegible] sponsored Anti-Communist Committee of Russian [illegible] Russian activities through its local branches [illegible] so-called protection, it should be borne in mind, has not been [illegible] majority of the emigres for, as Russian exiles in Europe [illegible] to Hitler's Germany as their champion against [illegible] Russians in the Far East viewed the Japanese.

The outbreak of hostilities between Germany [illegible] produce a demonstration of Russian nationalism [illegible] which was as surprising as it was annoying to the Japanese. [illegible] were, as elsewhere, many White Russians who looked forward to the victory of [illegible] and Russian fascists in Harbin congratulated the German Consul there while the [illegible] declared the beginning of a new National revolution in which it would take an active part.

Doubtless at Japanese instigation, a Declaration from [illegible] organizations was published in July, 1941, which stated that its signatories, as uncompromising enemies of Communism, looked to the Soviet-German war as the means of freeing Russia from Bolshevik oppression. There were protests at this Declaration, even from former Czarist officers, and Colonel Thornovsky, in resigning from the Union of Russian Army and Navy Men which had signed the document, wrote, "We cannot rejoice over the death of millions of young men who with their blood defend Russian soil. Under their Red Army tunic beats a heart no less Russian than ours. We send the defenders of our motherland our sincere wishes for complete victory."

A further effort to crush pro-Soviet sentiment was taken when it was announced through the emigre press and at Japanese bidding that Russians who [illegible] in activities of a character detrimental to the anti-Communist cause would suffer loss of their passports and expulsion from the country. In September, following a meeting of [illegible] Fascist leaders which the Japanese have convened, the Central Emigrants' Committee of North China issued a proclamation denouncing sympathy with the Soviet cause and declaring all those who entertained it to be political criminals. The Japanese-controlled anti-Communist committees were ordered to seek out and identify these people so that punishment could be meted out to them.

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Visa Division, Department of State

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

A general survey of White Russian communities throughout the world which was recently undertaken has shown that where political and economic pressure has been greatest - as in countries under Axis domination and in the Middle East where, although free from Axis control, their poor economic status has made them susceptible to political agitation and bribery by enemy agents - the majority of White Russians in those areas must be considered as either actively serving Axis interests or, at any rate, entertaining pro-Axis sentiments. It is questionable, however, whether in the majority of cases this is due so much to political principles as to motives of self-preservation and advancement. Russian emigres living in Axis territory know to their cost that, if they do not obey the authorities, the penalty is the concentration camp, or execution, while those in the Middle East have probably adopted their pro-German attitude mainly as an insurance against a possible Axis victory.

It is just because White Russians so generally allow purely opportunistic considerations to override their loyalties, that they are rightly considered as unreliable from a security point of view. This unreliability is, however, much less in evidence among White Russians in those areas (as in the British Commonwealth and in the United States), where, enjoying as they do, a standard of economic comfort and a freedom from political pressure unknown to their fellow exiles elsewhere, they are in the majority loyal to the country of their adoption and approve the Russian alliance.

These White Russians in these countries who have continued, even after Germany's attack on Russia, to entertain active pro-German sympathies are, as a nature of anti-Communist fanatics and political opportunists who have willingly adopted a pro-German attitude, to be regarded as dangerous from a security point of view.

Perhaps the only generalization involved regarding security considerations that can safely be made concerning White Russians is that each one of them must be considered on his individual record and against his political and security background.

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[illegible]

Date 14 October [illegible]

To: [illegible] Pettell

SECRET

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

Attached is a proposed cable drafted in SI, supporting the request for the transfer of Barnes to ETO.

You will note the memorandum from Dr. Langer stating that Barnes can not be moved and that Colonel Forgan should be notified of this. I understand from Ed Dodd that such a cable should not be sent out until another effort has been made to obtain Barnes' release for ETO. In view of the apparently pressing need for his services on the Field Photographic project, I should think you might want to consider strengthening the language of the SI cable, or rephrasing it to indicate the General's interest in the matter. I leave this to you, since you are more familiar with the subject than I am.

J. W. Auchincloss

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

SECRET

cable sent

10/18

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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. J. W. Auchincloss

FROM : E. R. Kellogg, Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch

DATE: 13 October 1944

SUBJECT: Attached Correspondence

This assignment is relative to the R. & A. portion of the project mentioned. I am in no position to comment on this except to add that the best man possible should be assigned to the project.

E. R. Kellogg

E. R. KELLOGG
Lieut., USNR
Acting Chief
Field Photographic Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

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

[illegible]

Date 17 Oct. 1944

To: Lt. Kellogg

CONFIDENTIAL

May:

Attached is a proposal from [illegible] in London to transfer Lt. James E. Barnes to ETO.

Please let us know if you have any comments on this suggestion.

J. W. Auchincloss
1st Lt. JAGD

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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OSS DETACHMENT (REAR)
APO 413
U.S. ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

4 October 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan

FROM: J. R. Forgan, Colonel, GSC

SUBJECT: Attached Cable

The joint aerial photographic project which is being planned by the Field Photographic Branch and the Map Division of R&A requires additional personnel for assignment to aerial teams.

The Map Division suggests that the most highly qualified member of this organization, Lt. (jg) James A. Barnes, be assigned to this work. Lt. Barnes is at present working with SI at Bari where the work in which he is engaged is of little consequence to the Map Division. Because of his training and his general familiarity with the type of operation envisaged, we request that you send the attached cable to Colonel Glavin requesting the transfer of Barnes to the ETO for this work. There is no person available in the ETO for this assignment.

Attachment

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO: OLAVIN

FROM: 109

COPY TO LANGER AND ROBINSON

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